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Abstract. Our research is a variant of the third party punishment game that we call 
Solomon’s Game. The main feature of this game is that players can not only punish unfair 
people but also help those individuals who are the victims of that unfairness. The aim of this 
experiment is to compare the human tendency to punish unfair behavior to the desire to help 
victims of that unfairness, in presence of a budget constraint and without the expectation of a 
long-run pecuniary gain.  
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 Introduction 
In the field of experimental economics the most studied reaction to unfairness is punishment. 
Experimental studies focused on the behavior of subjects when it is possible to punish whenever a 
cooperation norm or a redistribution norm is violated have represented an important contribution to 
theories concerning fairness.
1 In particular, the experimental results differ from the theoretical 
predictions based on a self-interested Homo Oeconomicus in two cases. The first case is represented 
by the second-party punishment (that is, the subject who is the victim of the unfairness can react 
and punish the agent responsible for the unfairness) in one-shot situations. In such a case no victim 
should react since the punishment activity will never imply a future gain. The second case is the 
third-party punishment (a subject who is not the victim can punish the agent responsible for the 
unfairness). Again, no external observer, according to the theoretical predictions, should punish. 
However, what the experimental evidence has suggested is that both second-party punishment in 
one-shot games (Güth et al., 1982; Roth, 1995; Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Ledyard, 1995; Bosman 
and van Winden, 1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr, 2001; Camerer and Fehr, 2003; Falk, Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2005) and third-party punishment, called also altruistic punishment
2 (Fehr and 
Gächter , 2002; Camerer and Fehr, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004a, 2004b), exist.
3 
Punishment is consistent with social preferences models and Gintis’ notion of strong 
reciprocity too.
4 According to inequity-aversion theories, the cost of punishment is a sacrifice 
chosen by fair-minded people who want more equitable final outcomes. Intention-based models 
justify punishment as a reaction to someone’s unfair intentions. According to Gintis (2000), a 
strong reciprocator experiences negative emotions (desire of revenge, desire of fighting against 
injustice, anger) when she faces unfair situations or social norms violations, and she is willing to 
sacrifice resources to punish unfairness and violation of norms, even when this does not provide any 
current or future material reward.
5  
                                                 
1The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Public Good Game belong to the first category, while the Ultimatum Game, the Third 
Party Punishment Game and the Power to Take Game belong to the second type. For a survey see Fehr (2001), Camerer 
and Fehr (2003). 
2 This definition is due to the fact that this activity implies only a cost for the Observer and no gain  (Fehr and Gächter , 
2002). 
3 Fehr and Fischbacher (2004a) and Carpenter and Matthews (2005) compare second party punishment to third party 
punishment. They find out that the former reports a stronger reaction to unfairness than the latter. 
4 See chapter 1 for a description in details. 
5 A case that underlines the importance of the role played by culture in people’s behavior is the situation where subjects 
make a decision in a scenario they never faced before. Even if people are able to distinguish between a one-shot and a 
repeated game, the former is a new situation for them. The idea is that when people face a novel situation, their 
tendency is to associate it to a well-known daily experience. Consequently, they behave as if they were in the familiar 
situation, that is, in a repeated game scenario (Henrich et al., 2001). This means that their social and cultural 
background influences their tendency to punish, and their behavior is a sort of “mirror” of their ‘structures of social 
interaction and modes of livelihood’ (p.5). In this experiment I consider that an external observer, who is witness to an unfair situation 
and who can intervene, can resist unfairness not only by punishing the oppressor, but also by 
helping the victim. 
A large literature assumes that altruism is the explanation of the tendency to help people (i.e. 
Becker, 1974; Charness and Rabin, 2002
6). In models based on altruism, the altruist’s utility 
increases as others’ well-being increases.  However, studies on volunteering and donations point out 
that it is relevant to distinguish between altruistic behavior and altruistic motivations.
7 The 
possibility that different motivations may be hidden behind an altruistic action has been taken into 
account both theoretically (Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987; Andreoni 1989, 1990; Frey, 1997) and 
empirically (Freeman, 1997; Van de Ven, 2000, Schokkaert, 2003).  
On the other hand, the activity of helping the victim is less studied in the experimental 
literature, which prefers to deal with: 1) testing the existence of altruistic behavior (i.e.Andreoni and 
Miller, 2002);  2) testing altruism against trust or inequity aversion (i.e. Bolton et al., 1998; Cox, 
Sadiraj K and Sadiraj V., 2002); 3) finding an incentive scheme that maximises the revenue coming 
from donations (i.e. Meier and Frey, 2004; Small and Loewenstein, 2003). To my knowledge, in 
experimental works helping has never been compared to punishment.
8 
The aim of this experiment is to compare the human tendency to punish unfair behavior to the 
desire to help victims of that unfairness, in presence of a budget constraint and without the 
expectation of a long-run pecuniary gain. Our experiment frame is a variant on the third party 
punishment game proposed by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004a).   
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the experimental design and in 
section 3 the expected results, while section 4 is devoted to the actual results and their 
interpretation. A comparison of our results with the existing models concerning fairness and 
altruism is in section 5. Conclusions are presented in 6. Appendix A contains tables and graphs. 
Appendix B reports the instructions of the experiment. 
 
                                                 
6 This refers to the previously mentioned model of quasi-maximin preferences.  
7 According to Barker (1993), an altruistic action may be due to three different motivations: instrumentalism, obligation 
and altruism. Instrumentalism assumes that people decide to help other subjects for pure material (social prestige, 
Mueller, 1975; Barker, 1993; Roy and Ziemek, 2000; Anheier and Salamon, 2001; allocation of money and personal 
exploitation of services, Mueller, 1975; Frank, 1988; gain of experience and skills, Mueller, 1975; Barker, 1993; 
Vaillancourt, 1994; Day and Devlin, 1998; Roy and Ziemek, 2000; Anheier and Salamon, 2001) or psychological self-
interest (Bandura, 1977; Barker, 1993). Sociobiological explanations of the presence of altruistic behavior among living 
beings belong to this category  (group selection, Wynne-Edward, 1962; kin-selection, Hamilton, 1964; reciprocal 
altruism, Trivers, 1971). Obligation is based on the fact that prosocial behavior can be learnt. If a subject’s cultural 
inheritance includes pro-sociality, she will feel morally obliged to behave accordingly. Altruism (for a more detailed 
survey on this topic, see Ottone, 2002) implies that prosocial behavior may reflect a genuine concern for the situation of 
someone else. Hoffman (1981), Fishhoff (1982), Deci and Ryan (1985), Batson (1999) believe in the heterogeneity of 
human forces that induce people to help someone in difficulty, including altruism. 
8  2. The experiment 
From the previous section it may be argued that human beings are inclined to promote fair 
behavior, punish people who do not respect this principle and help the victims. The real world and 
the experimental studies (above all the research promoted by Fehr) provide a relevant number of 
examples.  
Up to now the experimental works studied the level of punishment assigned to unfair subjects 
with respect to the degree of unfairness and with respect to the relationship existing between the 
unfair subject and the punisher. In particular, they concentrate on the analysis of second party 
punishment despite the importance of third party punishment as a social norm enforcement device 
(Gintis, 2000; Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a). Our research 
tries to give a contribution in this direction and to give, at the same time, a new input. We analyze 
the external observers’ tendency to punish unfair people and their tendency to help the victims, in 
presence of a budget constraint. This is why in our game the players can not only punish unfair 
people but also help those individuals who are the victims of that unfairness. 
 
2.1 Experimental Design 
The experiment has been run in the laboratory of experimental economics ALEX at the 
University of Eastern Piedmont in Alessandria, using the z-Tree  software (Fischbacher, 1999). 
Overall, we have run 1 treatment and 2 sessions, with a total of 48 participants (24 participants in 
each session).  
As we said, our tool was a variant on the Third Party Punishment Game t h a t  w e  c a l l  
Solomon’s Game (SG). In particular, each round included two stages. In the first stage couples of 
players were formed. In each couple the subjects played a Dictator Game. Player A was a Dictator 
and player B was a Receiver. Player A had to decide how to allocate a sum between player B and 
herself.  Player B couldn’t react to any decision made by A. In the second stage new subjects 
(players C) entered the game. Each new player was assigned to one of the couples that had played 
in the first stage. She was an Observer and had an endowment. Her task was to decide how to use 
that endowment. She could: 1) transfer money to B if she thought the Receiver had received from A 
an unfair sum; 2) spend money to sanction
9 A (each euro spent to punish A produced a sanction of 2 
euro) if she thought the Dictator had been too unfair; 3) both punish A and transfer money to B; 4) 
keep the whole sum. The situation is represented in Figure 1.  
 
                                                 
9 In real life, costs associated to punishing may include ‘the risk of retaliation or at least the potential loss of 
relationship, the loss of time or money, emotional tensions’ (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004b, p.186). Figure 1. 
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Where: 
S = sum to be allocated  
R = sum that A transfers to B 
J = C’s initial endowment  
p = sanction decided by C  
r = sum that C transfers to B 
a = cost of each single unit of punishment  
 
By backward induction, we obtain that in equilibrium player C would have never punished 
player A, and player A would have kept the whole sum. 
 
At the beginning of each session each player was randomly assigned a role (A, B or C) and 8 
groups of 3 participants were formed. In each group, players A and B played the Dictator Game 
during the first stage and player C entered the game in the second stage. A and C’s initial 
endowment was the same (10 euro) and the cost of one euro of punishment for player A was 0.5 
euro for player C. We did not assigned any show-up fee.  
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed about the sequential form of 
the game and about each player’s initial endowment. Each player participated in only one session 
and partnered players’ identities were unknown even when the session ended. We implemented the 
Transfer to B 
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Punishment of A strategy method
10 at the Observer’s stage in order to analyse subjects’ behavior in details. In fact, 
when we ran some ‘exploratory’ sessions, we realized that we had very few responses of the 
Observer to certain transfer levels.
11    
Each session of the experiment lasted about 45 minutes and each subjects earned on average 
6 euro. 
 
2.2 Expected results 
Rational and self-interested Observers would find it profitable neither to punish nor to 
transfer money to the other players. This directly turns out from the structure of the Solomon’s 
Game. Consequently, if people punished only for strategic and self-interested motivations they 
would not punish in this case. If subjects decide to punish or to transfer it may be due to social and 
emotional factors, such as the desire for equity, the desire to help other people and the feeling of 
anger toward those people who are unfair.  
Our sample may be made up of people with heterogeneous preferences. This means that the 
subjects will belong to two groups: some of them may be self-interested and their only aim will be 
the maximization of their own payoff, while other subjects will be fair-minded or altruist and, 
consequently, they will be interested in others’ payoffs. The former will keep the whole sum, no 
matter how the Dictators behave. The latter will react to unfairness.      
Taking account of the discussion of the previous sections and of the results obtained by Fehr 
and Fischbacher (2004a), my expected results were: 
1)  players have heterogeneous preferences; 
2)  the level of the intervention is proportional to the unfair offer of the Dictator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 When the strategy method is used, players are asked their choice for each possible case. The final payoff is 
determined on the basis of the situation that actually occurs.  
11 Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) too opted for the strategy method. They knew the possibility that people act in a 
different way when the strategy method is implemented with respect to a situation where they act after an actual choice 
is made by the opponents. However, they trust the conclusion by Cason and Mui (1998) and Brandts and Charness 
(2000) that the strategy method does not induce different behaviors.  3. Results and interpretation of the experimental evidence 
In this section we analyse the results we obtained during the experiment. In particular, we 
focus on the Observers’ behavior, on the Dictators’ decisions and on players’ beliefs. Each 
subsection is devoted to one of this class of results.  
 
3.1 Third Party Intervention 
 
Result 1. The actual behavior of the Observers disconfirms the classical hypothesis that they 
are only self-interested.  
 
At each transfer level below 5
12 there is a relevant percentage of Observers who decide to 
punish, while a high percentage of Observers decide to transfer money to the Receiver even when 
the transfer level is 5 (see Table 1 and Figure 2). Observers’ punishment differs significantly from 0 
at levels 0-3 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, P > 0,0007), while Observers’ transfer differs significantly 
from 0 at each level (Wilcoxon signed rank test, P = 0,0006). 
 
Table 1 – Punishment and Transfer distribution 
  When the Dictator transfers … 
Percentage  of  …  0 1 2  3  4  5 
Punishment  81% 62% 44%  19%  6%  0% 
Transfer  81% 81% 81%  62%  44%  37% 
 
Figure 2 
Punishment and Transfer distribution
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12 Since the initial endowment of the Dictator was 10 euro, we consider each transfer below 5 unfair. Result 2. The Observers’ average expenditure to intervene (punishment + transfer) increases 
as the Dictators’ transfer decreases. 
 
The Observers’ reaction is proportional to the degree of unfairness (see Table 2 and Figure 3). 
This may be explained by the fact that the higher the level of unfairness, more deeply people’s 
sense of justice is touched. 
 
Table 2 – Average Expenditure for Intervention  
  When the Dictator transfers … 
  0 1 2  3  4  5 
Average 
Expenditure 
3.56 2.69  2  1.31  1.12  1 
 
 
Figure 3 
Intervention pattern
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OLS regression
13 of intervention on the variables Dictator’s Transfer and  Dictator’s 
Transfer2 (the squared value of the Dictator’s transfer) shows that, as the Dictator’s transfer 
increases, the level of intervention decreases even if less than proportionally (slope coefficient of –
1.03 for the variable  Dictator’s Transfer and 0.1 for Dictator’s Transfer2, P = 0.000 and 0.001 
respectively). Figure 4 illustrates the predicted value of Intervention with confidence bands around.  
 
 
                                                 
13 Significance tests are based on robust standard errors to take account of dependence of each individual’s choices and 
independence across individuals’ choices (cluster option). Figure 4 
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Result 3. Both the Observers’ average punishment and average transfer increase as the 
Dictators’ transfer decreases. 
    
The increasing level of  punishment (see table 3 and Figure 5) when unfairness increases is in 
line with the results of other experiments (see for instance Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004a, Bernhard, 
2001). The same pattern is followed by the transfer (see table 3 and Figure 5). This may support that 
helping the victim is another kind of reaction to unfairness.  
 
Table 3 – Average Punishment and Average Transfer  
  When the Dictator transfers … 
  0 1 2  3  4  5 
Average 
Punishment 
1.69 1.06 0.62  0.25  0.06  0 
Average 
Transfer 
1.87 1.62 1.37  1.06  1.06  1 
 
 
 
 Figure 5 
Punishment and Transfer Pattern
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OLS regression of punishment on the variables Dictator’s Transfer and Dictator’s Transfer2 
(the squared value of the Dictator’s transfer) confirms the relation between the level of punishment 
and the degree of unfairness. As the Dictator’s transfer increases, the level of punishment decreases 
even if less than proportionally (slope coefficient of –0.68 for the variable  Dictator’s Transfer and 
0.068 for Dictator’s Transfer2, P = 0.000 and 0.001 respectively). 
We obtain a similar result when regressing the Observer’s transfer on the variables Dictator’s 
Transfer and Dictator’s Transfer2. The former has a significant (P = 0.079) and negative (-0.36) 
slope coefficient, while the latter has a positive (0.035) but not significant (P = 0.123) coefficient. 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 illustrate the predicted value of Punishment and transfer with confidence 
bands around. 
Figure 6 
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 Figure 7  
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Result 4. Observers’ transfer tends to be higher than punishment. 
 
At each Dictator’s transfer level, the average transfer from the Observers is higher than the 
average punishment (see Table 3 and Figure 5). We conduct the Wilcoxon test to check whether 
punishment differs significantly from transfer. The result is that this difference is significant at 
levels 1-5 (P > 0.01), but not at level 0 (P = 0.47). If we run a Spearman correlation test to analyse a 
possible correlation between punishment and transfer, we find out that they are significantly 
correlated at levels 0 and 1 (P = 0.54 and P = 0.51 respectively), but not at levels from 2 to 5 (P > 
0.13).  
This may imply that, when the Dictator is extremely unfair, the Observer’s reaction is bi-
directional: a combination of punishment and transfer is used. When unfairness is not extreme, the 
Observer prefers helping the victim rather than punishing the Dictator.  
In October I’ll run another treatment where the Observer is not allowed to transfer 
money to the Receiver. In this way, I’ll check whether punishment and transfer are 
substitutes or complements. 
 
 
Result 5. People’s preferences are heterogeneous.  
Our hypothesis that subjects have heterogeneous preferences is supported by the data. If we 
analyse our sixteen Observers’ behavior, we have two selfish players and fourteen fair-minded 
individuals. According to their different intervention decisions, it is possible to identify (see Table 4 
and Figure 8) four different types (and no residual category) that we label: 
- Selfish: an Observer who never intervenes; 
- Samaritan: an Observer who only transfers to the Receiver when she intervenes; - Revenger: an Observer who only punishes when she intervenes; 
- Judge: a subject who chooses a combination of punishment and transfer when she 
intervenes. 
 
 
Table 4. Types 
 
TYPES 
Selfish Samaritan  Revenger  Judge 
12.5% 
(2 over 16) 
6.25%  
(1 over 16) 
6.25% 
(1 over 16) 
75%  
(12 over 16)
 
 
Figure 8 
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The change we made in the original version of the Third Party Punishment Game (by 
introducing the possibility for C to help B) is useful since it makes it possible both to provide a 
more detailed classification of human types and to discover that the attitude of human beings to help 
those who suffer from an injustice is strong. Thirteen Observers over sixteen decide to transfer 
money to the Receiver. One of them decides only to transfer without judging and punishing an 
unfair Dictator. This may signify that the desire of revenge and punishment is not the only emotion 
stimulated by people’s sense of justice. People care about the condition of the victims.  
 
 
 3.2 Subjective unfairness 
During the experiment the Observers were asked their ideal transfer from the Dictator to the 
Receiver (see Table 5 and Figure 9 for the ideal transfer’s distribution among the Observers). If we 
assume that this ideal transfer is a subjective reference point of fairness (instead of the objective fair 
transfer of 5 euro), each Dictator’s transfer lower than the ideal transfer may be considered unfair. 
In this case, it is possible to analyse the Observer’s reaction when her subjective principle of 
fairness is violated. 
 
 
Table 5 – Ideal Dictators’ Transfer distribution 
  Dictator’s transfer 
  0  1  2 3 4 5 
Percentage 
of cases 
18.75% 0%  12.50%  31.25%  25%  12.50% 
 
 
 
Figure 9 
Ideal Dictator's transfer - The point of view of the 
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If the ideal transfer is a reference point of fairness, this implies that only 12.5% of the 
Observers consider the equal share of the pie the fair share. This may be due to the fact that the 
Observers think that the pie is not 10 euro but 20 euro (the sum of the Dictator’s and of the 
Observer’s endowment), since the Observer too may transfer money to the Receiver. If the 
Observer thinks, for example, that he has to share with the Dictator the duty to give money to the 
Receiver, the Receiver’s fair payoff is 20/3 and the Dictator fair transfer is about 3. At a first sight, it seems not to be the case, since the Observer’s  average transfer is only 1.06 when the Dictator’s 
transfer is 3 (see Table 3). Moreover, neither the Dictators seem to expect a conditional transfer 
from the Observers (see Table 6) and when we test a possible correlation between the Dictator’s 
transfer and his expectation about the Observer’s transfer, we find out that they are not significantly 
correlated (Spearman correlation test, P = 0.78).   
 
Table 6  
  Expected Observer’s Transfer   
Dictator’s 
Transfer 
0 1  2  3  4  5  Total
0  2 
66.7% 
0 
0% 
1 
33.3% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
100
% 
1  0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
100
% 
2  0 
0% 
2 
66.7% 
1 
33% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
100
% 
3  1 
20% 
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0% 
2 
40% 
2 
40% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
5 
100
% 
4  1 
33% 
1 
33% 
1 
33% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
100
% 
5  1 
50% 
0 
0% 
1 
50% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
100
% 
 
 
However, in October I’ll run another treatment where the Observer is not allowed to 
transfer money to the Receiver. If the ideal transfer is closer to 5 than in this treatment, this 
may imply that the Observer reference point of fairness is influenced by the possibility to 
transfer to the Receiver.  
 
 
Result 6. Both  punishment and transfer are sensitive to subjective unfairness.  
 
From Figure 10, it emerges the fact that our Observers punish when the Dictator’s transfer is 
lower but not when it is higher than their ideal transfer. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 10. 
Punishment and Subjective Unfairness
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OLS regression of punishment on the variables Negative Subjective Unfairness
14, Positive 
Subjective Unfairness
15  and their squared values confirms the relation between the level of 
punishment and the degree of subjective unfairness (slope coefficient of 0.75 for the variable 
Negative Subjective Unfairness, P = 0.01; while the other variables are not significant). The 
constant term is not significant. This means that, even if punishment occurs when the ideal transfer 
corresponds to the real transfer, this is not significant. 
 
In Figure 11 the relation between subjective unfairness and transfer from the Observer to the 
Receiver is depicted. It is clear that the level of transfer increases as the Dictator’s transfer becomes 
lower and lower than the Observer’s ideal transfer. However, some transfers still exist even when 
the Dictator transfers to the Receiver a sum that is higher than the ideal transfer.  
 
                                                 
14 Negative Subjective Unfairness is defined as max {0, Ideal Transfer – Real Transfer} 
15 Positive Subjective Unfairness is defined as max {0, Real Transfer - Ideal Transfer} Figure 11. 
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OLS regression of transfer on the variables Negative Subjective Unfairness and  Positive 
Subjective Unfairness confirms the relation between the level of transfer and the degree of 
subjective unfairness (slope coefficient of 0.26 for the variable Negative Subjective Unfairness, P = 
0.078; while the other variable is not significant). The constant term is significant (coefficient of 
1.1, P = 0.007). 
 
3.3 The Dictator’s Transfer 
Result 7. The actual behavior of the Dictators disconfirms the classical hypothesis that they 
will keep the whole sum. 
 
Dictators’ transfers differ significantly from 0 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, P = 0,000). About 
81% of the Dictators give more than nothing to their assigned Receiver (see Figure 12 and Table 7). 
The average transfer from the Dictator to the Receiver is 2.69.  
 
Table 7 – Dictators’ Transfer distribution 
  Dictator’s transfer 
  0  1  2 3 4 5 
Percentage 
of cases 
18.75%  0% 18.75% 31.25% 18.75% 12.50% 
 
 Figure 12 
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Two possible motivations may explain this result. It may be possible that some Dictators are 
fair-minded and they decide to give some money to the Receiver. On the other hand, it may be 
possible that a self-interested Dictator decides to transfer a sum that is high enough to avoid 
punishment. If this is the case, the classical theory fails again: punishment is a credible threat.  
 
3.4 Players’ Beliefs 
Result 8. The beliefs of the Receivers over the average transfer of the Dictators corresponds 
to the observed transfer from the Dictators. At the same time, there is no difference between the 
observed Dictators’ average transfer and the Observers’ ideal average transfer. 
We asked the Receiver their expectations about the transfer from the Dictator. The average 
expected transfer is 2.69. This perfectly corresponds to the observed average transfer (2.69). The 
Mann-Whitney test confirms this correspondence   (P = 0.95).  
The Observers’ ideal average transfer is 2.81. It is slightly higher than the observed  average 
transfer. However, this difference is not significant (Mann-Whitney test, P = 0.76). 
 
 
Result 9. There is no significant difference between the Dictators’ beliefs about the 
Observers’ punishment and transfer as well as there is no significant difference between the 
Receivers’ beliefs about the Observers’ punishment and transfer. 
 
The average punishment expected by the Dictators, 0.12, does not differs significantly from 
the observed average punishment, 0.81 (Mann-Whitney test, P = 0.135). The same conclusion holds when we analyse the transfers: the average transfer expected by the Dictators, 1.31, does not differs 
significantly from the observed average transfer, 1.19 (Mann-Whitney test, P = 0.710).   
Even when we analyse the Responders’ beliefs about the Observers’ behavior, we do not find 
any significant difference. The expected average punishment is 0.87 while the expected average 
transfer is 0.93. Expected punishment is slightly higher than the observed punishment while the 
opposite is true for transfer. However, this values do not differ significantly from the actual values 
(Mann-Whitney test, P = 0.504 and P = 0.451 respectively).  
 
5. Comparison with social preferences theories 
As we mentioned in the introduction, social preferences theories, where subjects take into 
account not only their own material payoff but also others’ payoffs, have been developed. To what 
extent are these theories suitable to explain the results obtained in our experiment? 
Theories of unconditional altruism may explain why third parties decide to transfer money, 
but they never predict punishment.  
Fairness theories face several problems in explaining third party punishment. The model 
proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) suggests that people care about their position relative to 
one another. In our experiment  the fair share should be 1/3 of the total endowment, that is, each 
player should have 20/3. Actually, with an initial endowment of 10, the Observer has ½ of the total 
endowment. Consequently, she should be willing to decrease her material payoff. However, 
punishment increases the share of the Observer, because reducing the Dictator’s payoff by 2 costs 
only 1. Suppose that the Observer spends 2 euro to punish the Dictator. The total payoff is now 14 
and the Observer’s payoff is 8, that is, 2/7 (> ½) of the total. The only possible solution for the 
Observer is to transfer money to the Receiver until her own payoff corresponds to the fair share. 
This model may explain the behavior of the Samaritans, but not the behavior of the Judges or the 
Revengers.  
The model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) can usually predict third party punishment and 
transfers to worse-off subjects. Fehr and Schmidt assume that subjects are self-centred inequity 
averse and, consequently, they are willing to spend money to decrease the payoff of people who are 
better-off and to increase the payoff of people who are worse-off. In our experiment, if the Dictator 
keeps the whole initial endowment, her payoff is equal to the payoff of the Observer and there 
would be no reason for the third party to punish someone who is as rich as her. At the same time, it 
would not be profitable to transfer money to the Receiver because it creates a disadvantageous 
inequality for the Observer. If the Dictator transfers any sum to the Receiver, her payoff is always 
lower than the Observer’s. The Revenger’s  behavior is not consistent with the model by Fehr and Schmidt since there is no outcome-oriented reason to punish the worse-off  Dictator. On the other 
hand, the Samaritan’s behavior may be explained if the Observer transfers to the Receiver an 
amount smaller or equal to what the Dictator has sent. Fehr and Schmidt predict the Judge’s 
behavior only when the Observer chooses a combination of transfer and punishment that leaves 
Observer and dictator with the same payoff (this is not the case for half Observers).  
The intention-based reciprocity models by Rabin (1993) and Dufwenbeg and Kirchsteiger 
(2004) can predict neither third-party punishment nor third-party transfer. They are based on the 
assumption that the Dictator is only punished if she is unkind to the Observer and the Receiver only 
receives a transfer if she is kind to the Observer. None of our types is explained by these models.     
The model by Falk and Fischbacher (2000) and the DASM model by Kohler (2003) have the 
same predictable power as the model by Fehr and Schmidt.  
The hybrid model (social welfare concern + reciprocity) developed by Charness and Rabin 
(2000) may explain all our types. Punishment is the Observer’s reaction to the Dictator’s 
misbehavior, while transfer comes from the quasi-maximin principle, according to which the 
Observer transfers money to the Receiver to improve the condition of the poorer player. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The aim of this experiment is to compare the tendency to punish unfair behavior and the 
desire to help victims of that unfairness, in presence of a budget constraint and without the 
possibility for a long-run pecuniary gain. Our research tool is a variant of the Third Party 
Punishment Game that we call Solomon’s Game. While in the original version of the game the 
external Observer was only allowed to punish the Dictator, in our new version we introduce the 
possibility for the Observer to transfer money to the Receiver.  
Our expected results are mostly confirmed. In particular: 
1)  players have heterogeneous preferences. In our experiment it is possible to identify 
four different ‘Types’; 
2)  the level of intervention is proportional to the unfair offer of the Dictator; 
3)         when we compare our results with the existing social preferences models, we find out 
that the hybrid model by Charness and Rabin has a good predictable power, while the model by 
Fehr and Schmidt fails to explain several choices of half players. 
 
In my opinion, several results deserve a further inquiry. First of all, the role of the Observer’s 
transfer. In particular, it should be useful to run a treatment with the original version of the Third 
Party Punishment Game where the Observer can only punish (this will be done in October). In this way it would be possible to check whether punishment and transfer are substitutes or complements. 
Moreover, it would be possible to check whether the possibility to transfer influences what we 
called subjective unfairness.  
Secondly, it would be interesting to make the Dictator earn his initial endowment and analyse 
if this changes the Observer’s notion of fairness and, consequently, his reaction.  
The last point is the effect of the intervention cost. We ran some pilots where both 
punishment and transfer were free for the Observer. The effect was that, for each level of the 
Dictator’s transfer, the Observers intervened (by punishing and transferring) more. The idea is that 
intervention reflects prosociality. This is a sort of ordinary good, whose demand increases as its 
price decreases.    
  
 
 Appendix A – Instructions  
 
FIRST SCREEN. Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating. There are 
neither difficulties nor tricky questions. You are only required to follow the instructions that will 
appear on your screen. Your answers will be absolutely anonymous. It will not be possible to the 
experimenter to match the answers with the person who provided them. Silence during the 
experiment is required. 
 
SECOND SCREEN. The experiment involves three different participants (referred to as 
Player A, Player B and Player C) and it is made up by two stages. At the beginning of the first 
stage, you will be randomly assigned a role (A, B or C). no participant will know the identity of the 
partnered subjects. 
 
FIRST ROUND. Players A and B have to share 10 euro. In particular, subject A has an initial 
endowment of 10 euro and has to decide whether to transfer 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 euro to the Receiver.  
Subject B has an initial endowment of 0 euro and cannot react to any decision taken by A.  
SECOND ROUND. Player C has an initial endowment of 10 euro. Her task is to decide how 
to use those 10 Euro. She can: 1) transfer money to B if she thinks B has received from A an unfair 
sum; 2) spend money to sanction A (each euro spent to punish A produces a sanction of 2 euro) if 
she thinks subject A has been too unfair; 3) both punish A and transfer money to B; 4) keep the 
whole sum.   
To sum up, she is allowed to allocate her 10 euro as she wants as soon as: 1) the sum of the 
euro that C uses to punish A, that C transfers to B and that C keeps is equal to 10; 2) the sums that 
C allocates are in whole euro (C cannot transfer eurocent).  
 
Player C is asked to declare how she would transfer to B and spend to punish A if A’s 
transfer is 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 euro. The final pay-off is computed on the basis of A’s actual transfer to 
B.  
 
THIRD SCREEN. To be sure that you have understood, check if it is clear that: 
- if A decides to transfer 2 euro to B and C decides to transfer 1 euro to B, A will gain 8 euro, 
B 3 euro and C 9. 
- If A decides to transfer 2 euro to B and C decides to pay 2 euro to punish A, A will gain 4 
euro, B 2 euro and C 8. 
- If A decides to transfer 2 euro to B and C decides to transfer 3 euro to B and to pay 1 euro to 
punish A, A will gain 6 euro, B 5 euro and C 6. 
- If A decides to transfer 2 euro to B and C decides to keep the 10 euro, A will gain 8 euro, B 
2 euro and C 10. 
 
FOURTH SCREEN. More generally, it should be clear that:  
- each euro that C transfers to B increases B’s gain by the amount of 1 euro; 
- each euro that C spends to punish A decreases A’s gain by the amount of 2 euro. 
 
FIFTH SCREEN. Before the experiment can begin, you will be asked some control 
questions, to check whether you have understood the rules. The experiment will begin as soon as 
every participant has successfully answered all control questions. 
 
The following screens display the control questions and the real sessions. 
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